

**China and Africa:
New approaches to aid, trade and international cooperation**

**Kenneth King¹
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Faculty of Education, HKU²**

This is a first attempt³ to lay out some of the emerging issues in China's current conceptualisation of aid, trade and international cooperation. It is a particularly opportune moment to do so with a perspective on Africa, since China has just in January 2006 announced its new *African Policy* (China 2006). The purpose of this short presentation is as much to suggest and look out for areas around international cooperation that may be worth exploring as to offer definitive insights. The highly provisional nature of this exercise would make the latter totally inappropriate.

China's angle on development cooperation may be a useful way of examining its relations with the rest of the developing world, and especially Africa. As a country that presents itself as 'the largest developing country in the world' (ibid. p. 1), and as country that does not expect to have eradicated poverty until 2050,⁴ it continues to be one of the world's largest recipients of official development assistance (ODA)⁵ at a time when it is increasingly being perceived as one of the most important of the non-DAC donors.⁶ Whilst not identifying itself with this club of 'Northern' donors, China nevertheless perceives its own history of development, poverty reduction and industrialisation as having direct resonance for other developing countries.

Although there is now a new Africa policy, China perceives itself as having had a longstanding historical relationship with a large part of the developing world. In the case of Africa, this is seen as having existed for over half a century. While there was a significant if selective element of Chinese assistance to African countries during this time, the emphasis was perceived to have been on the principles of 'equality, mutual benefit,

¹ Prof. King is in HKU as a Distinguished Visiting Professor associated with the Faculties of Education and Arts for 12 months from March 2006.

² I should like to acknowledge the kindness of Jiang Kai, post-doctoral fellow in CERC, in assisting me with some sources on the structure and organisation of China's aid. Also Carol and Emily were very helpful. The responsibility for any weaknesses in this paper remains mine.

³ My first connection with aid and China was asking Cheng Kai-ming to reflect on 'Foreign aid to education in China', in 1998-9, see King, K. and Buchert, L. (eds) 1999. But the focus then was on external aid to China.

⁴ A 2006 foresight report by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Xinhua News Feb 9, 2006

⁵ In 2003-4, China received over 2 billion US dollars.

⁶ There are currently 23 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, covering the members of the European Union, but excluding the recent accession states, Canada, United State, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, and Switzerland. Their official development assistance (ODA) is analysed annually in the OECD DAC, *Development Cooperation Report* – the latest being for 2005.

solidarity and common development' (ibid.p.2), but with a strong ideological lens (He, Wenping 2005).

In this short paper, the emphasis will be principally on how this relationship has changed and been re-conceptualised over time. In particular, there will an examination of some of key modalities that have been evident in recent years, and a review of some of the features of the new *African Policy*.

As this audience has a professional interest in education, there will be some acknowledgement of how the new policy may affect the education sector, and especially student and technician exchanges. Finally, as this seminar is closely linked to the Comparative Education Research Centre (CERC), we shall pay some attention to whether China's emerging development cooperation policy has any parallel with the experience of other more established countries, or of those countries like India, Korea, Thailand and Malaysia which have specialised agencies responsible for this dimension.

The Importance of History and Historic Principles

In many of the announcements about visits and ties with individual African countries, there is frequently an acknowledgement that the relationship is a longstanding one, going back 20, 30 or even 50 years.⁷ Thus at the very beginning of the new *African Policy* there is a reference to the continued relevance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which themselves go back 50 years to the joint communiqué between Zhou Enlai and Nehru, but which have since become a regular part of the discourse of international documents.⁸ The Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, celebrated the 50th anniversary of these Principles in 2004, but in the process gave them a rather interesting tweak – from peaceful coexistence to economic competitiveness:

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are not just principles for peace, but also principles for development, said Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at a meeting Monday to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Five Principles.

Wen said that in applying the Five Principles to the economic realm, all nations should respect the right of the countries to make independent economic decisions, their equal right to participate in competition on a level of playing field, and their access to mutual benefit and economic success. (Wen 2004)

⁷ Thus in a recent donation to Zimbabwe, it was recalled that 'The People's Republic of China cherish the traditional friendship with Zimbabwe, which dates back to the pre-independence era...' In another report, it was recalled that January 2006 was the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations with Egypt (Xinhua News). For several African countries, the details of intensive bilateral interactions over 40 years is broken down by politics, economic cooperation, social sectors, and military. See for example Tanzania: www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/3099/default.htm

⁸ The five principles cover: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

More generally, the new African Policy asserts that ‘China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange’ and, somewhat surprisingly, that the regions share ‘similar historical experience’ (China 2006: 2).

In the same spirit of reliving and reworking principles enunciated 40 years earlier, it is worth noting, for the purposes of this paper, the ‘eight principles governing foreign aid’, which were first outlined by Zhou En Lai during his visit to Ghana and Mali in the early 1960s. These are certainly not principles laid out by a donor nation for the enlightenment of its selected recipients. Quite the opposite. It is important to note that the eight principles come hard on the heels of a further five principles guiding China’s relations with African and Arab nations first proposed by Zhou Enlai during his visit to Egypt in late 1963-early 1964. On the character of China’s solidarity at the time, it was often stated by the Premier during this major tour of Africa and Asia that ‘mutual economic assistance among the Asian and African countries was the kind of assistance between poor friends who were in the same boat pulling oars together’ (China, 2000).

These eight principles for foreign aid were laid down at a time, in the early 1960s, when countries like Britain and Sweden were just establishing their own development cooperation agencies. It is worth looking at the range of what is encompassed in the principles and quoting them in full:

- a. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alm [sic] but as something mutual.
 - b. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges.
 - c. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.
 - d. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development.
 - e. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.
 - f. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them.
 - g. In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.
 - h. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.
- These eight principles fully give expression to the sincere desire of China in seeking to

conduct economic and cultural cooperation with the newly-emerged countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. (China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000)

There are some fascinating dimensions to these 40 year-old principles, several of which continue to have salience today. Just three will be picked out here. One of these relates to the Chinese emphasis on the importance of promoting self-reliance and avoiding aid dependency. This should have peculiar resonance in Africa today when some countries, such as Malawi, derive 50% of their entire recurrent budget from external sources. What this means for what the Chinese call the 'road to self-reliance and independent economic development' is worth questioning. Equally, what it means for other countries such as Rwanda and Uganda to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) but with 50% dependence on external aid needs careful attention.

Another key principle relates to the fascinating set of comments on experts. What is said about the importance of experts not becoming 'expats' or expatriates with special privileges compared to their local 'counterparts' is also very significant. There is not a great deal of empirical evidence about how this Chinese aspiration for their experts to be ordinary has worked out, but Lindsey Hilsum's comment on Chinese expatriate workers in Sierra Leone 40 years after the 8 principles were agreed is interesting reading:

Many companies bring even their labour force from China. Africans watch in surprise as buildings are erected in weeks. ('The Chinese don't seem to rest,' Sierra Leone's Information Minister told me. 'We could learn from that.') Managers and translators live in barracks-style accommodation. No spouses, no children, none of the comfort and expense Western expatriates demand. (Hilsum 2005: 3)

The third principle relates to the notion that aid should avoid becoming 'a unilateral alm' [sic] and that conditionalities should not be attached to such aid. Over the last 10-15 years, many bilateral and multi-lateral agencies have in fact made aid dependent on a whole series of conditionalities – not least the introduction of multi-party democracy. China, by contrast, has remained true to the spirit of the early 1960s, and continues to be critical of what it regards as the politicisation of conditionalities.

The Character of the New Type of Strategic Partnership with Africa

Given the importance of these existing principles, how may we conceptualise China's new approach? This is said in the *African Policy* to constitute a 'new type' of partnership. But what is new about this new partnership? The key bullet points seem very similar to the existing framework:

Sincerity, friendship and equality
Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity
Mutual support and close coordination
Learning from each other
The one-China principle

The only one that is not specifically mentioned in the earlier statement of eight principles is the one-China principle. But, that aside, there is little in the summary of the new approach that seems new. There is the same strong emphasis on the mutuality of the relationship, but it may be that it is the emphasis on what is now termed ‘win-win economic cooperation’ along with a much less ideological political equality with the great majority of African nations that is at the heart of the new type of strategic partnership. In reality, it may be more an increase in the intensity and frequency of the interactions that have taken place in all four major domains of the Africa policy paper that make for the new partnership: these are the political field; the economic field; education, science, culture, health and social fields; and, finally, peace and security. It is not exactly clear what the role of such a policy paper is in China today, but arguably this particular paper is more a confirmation of what is already massively underway than an aspiration to make certain things happen. It is more a rationalisation of the ways in which China is already a major player in Africa than a plan to become one.

It is important to emphasise that *China’s African Policy* is very different from a British White Paper on International Development. The last two of these have very much been aid policy papers, as is the third for which, coincidentally, the consultation process has been announced in the very month that *China’s African Policy* was released. Britain’s paper, *Eliminating World Poverty*, will emerge later this year from a Ministry that is dedicated to aid or development cooperation. No such entity exists in China. The core questions for the new policy paper will be:

What can we do to reduce poverty and deliver development more quickly?

What policies are needed in the UK and internationally to create the conditions necessary for reducing poverty?

How can the international development system be reformed so that it delivers better results for development, and is more responsive to the needs of poor people?
(DFID 2006: 1)

The 10 page consultation document has no less than 34 references to ‘poverty’, ‘poor’ and ‘poorest’, while these words do not appear at all in the 7 pages of China’s policy. Both papers are concerned, of course, with ‘development’, but the China paper’s explicit but very restricted focus on aid is subsumed within the four wider domains mentioned above.⁹

The political field

In the political domain, firstly, He Wenping has collated some of the data on very high level visits in both directions, and there has been an unprecedented frequency of these since 1990. But equally at lower levels, including the twinning of Chinese cities, legislative bodies and provinces with counterparts in Africa there has been an impressive level of interaction (He 2005: 6-7). The web-site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the

⁹ There are 19 references to aid in the UK consultative document and just 1 reference in the China document.

source of an extraordinary level of visits, commemorations, and agreements involving counterparts in Africa, as well as in Beijing.¹⁰

The economic field

It is difficult to exaggerate the range and intensity of this political activity, or to judge what the declarations of solidarity and south-south cooperation amount to, but their effectiveness may partly be judged by the extent of what has been happening in the second domain, that of economic cooperation. There are no less than ten dimensions to this aspect which are picked out by the Policy Paper and the scale is impressive – from trade and investment, to agriculture, infrastructure and resources. In addition to trade, there is specific mention of elements that are more explicitly linked to aid and development cooperation; these concern debt reduction and economic assistance. The latter is the closest that the policy paper comes to what would be considered aid. There is just the following single sentence: ‘In light of its own financial capacity and economic situation, China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached.’ (China 2006: 4). Both the UK and the China papers are also concerned with multilateral cooperation and the reform of the international system; in this sphere there is a degree of overlap, as both countries are concerned that the voices of developing countries be more influential in international financial affairs.

But what is intriguing, in this age of target-setting, is the absence in the China policy paper of quantitative data on the scale of China’s trade with Africa, its foreign direct investment with Africa, or indeed the scale of its current or intended economic assistance (in the aid sphere). This is all the more surprising as China-Africa trade is said to have jumped by a staggering 39% in the first 10 months of 2005, reaching \$32 billion US dollars (BBC 6 January 2006), with China’s exports to Africa totalling \$15.25 billion and imports from Africa totalling \$16.92 billion for the same period of 2005.¹¹

There are however some figures available for the debt cancellation for African countries since 2000; by June 2002, 156 African debts totalling 10.5 billion RMB (\$1.2 billion) had been cancelled (He Wenping 2005: 10). But there is no indication of what the total amount of economic assistance (or aid) there may have been over the early 2000s. To an extent, some of these figures can be filled in when we turn to the third domain, Education, Science, Culture, Health and Social Aspects.

Education, Science, Culture, Health and Social Aspects.

There seems little doubt that this third dimension of cooperation in *China’s African Policy* has been already strongly influenced by several key earlier events and agreements. The first of these - the ‘China-Africa Forum on Cooperation –Ministerial Meeting, Beijing 2000’ in October 2000 produced ‘The Beijing Declaration’ and ‘The Programme of Cooperation on Economic and Social Development’. Together, these two documents

¹⁰ China has been responsible for building or re-building parliaments in Africa, from Freetown to Dar es Salaam (Hilsum 2005; Lyabwene, personal communication, 22 March 2006).

¹¹ See special issue of IDS Bulletin, vol 37 No 1 Jan 2006 on *Asian Drivers* for detail on imports and exports by country to Africa from China.

provided the basis for the *African Policy* 6 years later. Equally, the series of three yearly China-Africa ministerial conferences which were set up at the Beijing Meeting, and reinforced in the Addis Ababa meeting in December 2003, gave further support to several agreements in the social sectors.¹² Just how important the bilateral agreements are between China and individual African countries is not yet clear. But is a strong acknowledgement by China of the particularity of country differences. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the Beijing Declaration is much sharper on the politicisation of human rights and on the need to respect national diversity than the later *China African Policy* document:

Each country has the right to choose, in its course of development, its own social system, development model and way of life in light of its national conditions. Countries, that vary from one another in social system, development level, historical and cultural background and values, have the right to choose their own approaches and models in promoting and protecting human rights in their own countries. Moreover, the politicization of human rights and the human rights conditionalities on economic assistance should be vigorously opposed as violation of human rights. (Beijing Declaration 2000)¹³

In the field of human resources development and education, more generally, the *African Policy* acknowledges the role of the 'African Human Resources Development Foundation', set up, in 2002, after the first China-Africa Ministerial meeting of 2000, and notes that it will be given 'full play in training African personnel'. Again, there is little quantitative data or target setting, but the intention is to expand exchange of students between China and Africa, increase the number of government scholarships, and continue to send teachers to help African countries in Chinese language teaching. There is a passing reference to educational aid: China will 'carry our educational assistance project to help develop Africa's weak disciplines' but no further detail.

One of the most commonly available target figures declared after the Addis Ababa, China-Africa Ministerial Meeting in December 2003 was for African student numbers. The undertaking was to train 10,000 African personnel in the following three years. The location of the training was not made explicit, nor was the length. Where figures are available, they often relate to bilateral relations, or to particular historical periods. Thus in a summary of educational exchanges and cooperation between China and Africa, over 4 time periods, from 1949 to 1996, it is estimated by the then Department of Foreign Affairs of the State Education Commission that there had been a total of 4,570 African exchange students (Gillespie 2001: 247-9). This pales almost into insignificance when compared to the more than 700,000 Chinese students who have gone to over a hundred countries for further training between 1978 and 2003. But it is certainly the case that African trainees in China have risen dramatically since the turn of the century and the

¹² These three yearly Ministerial China-Africa meetings, convened under the aegis of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation, parallel the Japanese mechanism of TICAD I, II and III – the five yearly Tokyo International Conferences on African Development - which have so far taken place in 1993, 1998 and 2003.

¹³ By contrast the *African Policy* merely states that China will 'stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights' (China 2006: 3).

introduction of specific Africa initiatives. In fact we can see that there are planned to be twice as many in the three-year period 2003-2006 as in the almost 50 years from 1949.

For instance, in 2004, the number of Africans trained under the auspices of the Ministry of Commerce and of other ministries came to over 2400. The plan for 2005 was for this to rise to 3000, making it rather likely that the target of 10,000 would be reached within the 3 year proposed period.¹⁴ In the Ministry's breakdown, for 2005, there is a distinction between courses for what are termed 1757 'African officials' which cover a very considerable range: economic management, science and technology, telecommunication, e-commerce, public administration, finance, customs, Development Zones, traditional medicine, disease control, environmental protection, tourism, agriculture, forestry, meteorology, geology and textile. These are contrasted with 'technical training' for an additional 1000 plus trainees in: solar power, water-efficient irrigation, water pollution control, edible fungus, desert management, animal husbandry, pest prevention and control, health, vegetable growing, application of computer network, mini-hydropower station, fish-farming, paddy rice growing maintenance of agricultural machinery and food security.

At the moment it is not clear what proportion of these African student numbers are coming through other ministries such as the Ministry of Education – which has a department for cooperation and exchanges with Asian and Africa countries, but in 2004 it looked as if almost a third of African students were arriving through ministries other than Commerce.

There are, of course, many unanswered questions about these rapidly growing African trainee numbers. What proportion of them may be coming on what other donors might call project-related training? In other words, are they connected with the huge infrastructure projects which are going on all over Africa – from the re-building of the 1300 km Benguela Railway in Angola¹⁵ to the construction of dams, airports, and highways in many other countries? Or are they coming as individual scholars to the increasing number of courses now offered in English in China's universities and colleges?

But education exchanges are just one element of the social domain in the new *Africa Policy*. There is cooperation underway in many other sub-sectors – notably medicine and health; media; culture; environment; and administration, as well as in disaster reduction and humanitarian assistance. There is also a whole range of cooperation under the fourth domain of the *African Policy* – that of peace and security, which includes military cooperation.

Structures and Responsibilities for Development Cooperation

¹⁴ This figure of 10,000 compares favourably with Japan – where total foreign student numbers have reached 117,000, but where Japanese supported students remain around 9,000.

¹⁵ See 'China on track to win friends in oil-rich Angola', in Financial Times, March 4 2006. I owe this reference to John Bray.

We have already noted the key role of the Ministry of Commerce in respect of capacity building and training policy, and it is within the Ministry of Commerce, that the Department of Foreign Aid is located. It would appear that the Budget for Foreign Aid is actually drafted in this Department, and presented to the Ministry of Finance for approval. When approved, the budget is allocated via the Ministry of Commerce's Foreign Aid Department to a series of ministries that have an aid portfolio, such as Health, Education, Construction and Agriculture. For the moment, there is not an English version of the responsibilities of the Foreign Aid Department, but they appear to cover the following – though this page has not been updated since March 2002:

The major 8 functions of the Department of Foreign Aid, Ministry of Commerce of China:

- (1) To make and implement foreign aid policy, and to draft out laws, rules, and regulations regarding foreign aid; to study and advance reform approaches of foreign aid.
- (2) To make foreign aid plan and then implement, to draw out aid schemes for individual countries, and to confirm aid programs;
- (3) To take charge of inter-government aid negotiations, to underwrite aid agreements, to deal with affairs of inter-government aid; and to take charge of the repayment of foreign aid loans and debt restructuring.
- (4) To approve the bid qualification of enterprises to participate in all kinds of foreign aid programmes, to decide the results of programme bids, to deliver foreign aid programmes and tasks, and to supervise and inspect the implementation of all kinds of foreign aid programmes.
- (5) To draft out the budget of foreign aid funds, in particular annual funds, and to take charge of the statistical work related to foreign aid.
- (6) To make use of the foreign aid expenditure (funds), to supervise and administer the concessional foreign aid loans and foreign aid joint-venture & cooperation funding programmes, and to deal with major issues in inter-government aid.
- (7) To guide the relevant foreign aid activities of the Bureau of Foreign Economic Cooperation (the predecessor of the Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation).
- (8) To undertake other activities entrusted by ministers of MOC (MOC 2002)¹⁶

¹⁶ I am grateful to Jiang Kai for a translation of these responsibilities.

It is not yet known whether the Department for Foreign Economic Cooperation (FEC), which is also located within the Ministry of Commerce, and which does have an English language version (available since Monday 13th March 2006) sounds substantially different in Chinese from the Department of Foreign Aid. Certainly FEC is ‘aimed specifically at overseas investors in China’. By contrast, the Foreign Aid Department appears to be outward looking, though it may be that it is also concerned with foreign aid funds coming into China, if item 7 above is still relevant.

Questions about the scale, scope and conceptualization of China’s aid

Perhaps not too much significance should be attached to the location of the Department of Foreign Aid within the Ministry of Commerce. At one level, of course, it might suggest a close connection of aid with China’s trade policy, and in this sense may seem to run counter to one tradition in certain Western aid agencies of seeking to reduce – or even eliminate – aid that is tied to the provision of goods and services from the country providing the assistance.¹⁷

On the other hand, we currently know very little about how China conceptualises its ‘aid projects’ or even if it uses this particular terminology at all to describe any of its multiple investment initiatives in Africa. One of the problems about the current version of the world’s agenda for aid,¹⁸ built round the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – and before that the International Development Targets (IDTs) of the OECD-DAC – is that they are focused on a series of minimalist social targets with almost no link to what UNCTAD would term productive capacities (see King and Palmer 2005). The retreat from major infrastructure projects by many Western aid agencies and a preoccupation with the achievement of the MDGs may well mean that inadequate attention is currently being given to the financial sustainability of these Goals once aid moneys are withdrawn. In this connection it is worth noting that both the *Commission for Africa* (2005) and the *UN Millennium Report* (2005) paid a great deal of attention to trade, foreign direct investment, agricultural and urban development as necessary elements in integrated development strategies for Africa.

Whether China has stand-alone education projects or programmes is not currently known, but I would doubt it. We have already mentioned the possibility that there may be project-related training taking place in China, but equally likely is that training and capacity building are located, on site, within the infrastructure or investment projects in Africa. This is after all implied in one of the eight principles of foreign aid which we mentioned above: ‘In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.’

Be that as it may, there are currently many more questions to be answered about the role of development assistance in China’s current foreign and trade policies. Amongst those where research with colleagues in China could be valuable are the following:

¹⁷ The process of untying has gone furthest, at least on paper, with Britain’s DFID.

¹⁸ On the construction of world’s agenda, see King 2005 ‘African education, skills and work on the world’s development agenda, 2005’ in Beveridge et al 2005.

- A characterization of China's historical involvement in external assistance that doesn't start from an assumption that Western aid modalities and conditionalities are the norm;¹⁹
- An approach to aid that accepts that aid and trade may well be bundled in China in ways that are not satisfactorily covered by the existing discourse about tied aid;
- An understanding of the relationship between foreign assistance projects and initiatives that are grant-aided as compared with those which are linked to concessional or soft loans;
- The link between the debate on China as a continuing aid recipient (whether on IDA or IBRD terms) and its long-term role as an aid donor;
- An appreciation, for some of the reasons above, of the difficulty of unbundling China's aid, and expressing it in quantitative terms, as a proportion of GDP per capita;
- A recognition that aid may well be a function of a large number of specialist sector ministries while being located primarily in the Ministry of Commerce;²⁰
- A realization that in a series of major industrializing nations, including Korea, Chile, Brazil, Malaysia, India and Thailand, new approaches to development cooperation are being elaborated which it may be valuable to compare with China;
- An acknowledgement that China's role in Africa cannot satisfactorily be explained solely in terms of a search for natural resources, and for market access, but needs to take account of China's growing personnel presence in Africa, and its involvement in multiple forms of cooperation.

Hopefully, by the time of the third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation which takes place in Beijing later this year, there will be available a more developed recognition of the history, character, role and functions of China's development assistance portfolio. This would be a fitting end to the year that started with the launch of *China's African Policy*.

¹⁹ To date, He Wenping's article on "'All weather friend': the evolution of China's African policy' 2005 is the most relevant to this historical analysis.

²⁰ See Sawamura and Yokozeki 1999 for a discussion of no less than 17 ministries having been involved in bidding for aid moneys in Japan.

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